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Abstract
The paper presents a theoretical framework on the moderating effect of trust in 
authority on the relationship between tax rates, penalty, detection probability, cost 
of compliance, royalty rates, environmental regulations, and petroleum profit tax 
compliance. The objective of the proposed framework is to expand the Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) model of tax compliance by adding two more predictor variables 
relevant to the oil and gas industry (royalty rates and environmental regulations), and 
moderating variable (trust) to better explain the relationship. Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) model received a lot of criticisms for not considering other non-human factors 
that can help in determining taxpayers’ compliance behavior, hence the expansion of 
the model to include new variables, purely non-human factors which are relevant to the 
industry in question. A thorough search of the following databases: Scopus database, 
Web of Science, Emerald, Google Scholar, among others was conducted to come up 
with the relevant and related literature on the subject matter. Providing empirical 
evidence through validation of this framework would have important implications 
for policymakers in host oil and gas producing countries, oil and gas operators, the 
deterrence theory as well as future research.
Keywords: Trust in government, petroleum profit, tax, environmental regulation, 
royalty rates, compliance
1.0 Introduction
The current study is aimed at presenting a conceptual framework of the moderating 
effect of trust in government on the relationships between tax rates, penalties, detection 
probability, cost of compliance, royalty rates, environmental regulations, and petroleum 
profit tax compliance. Oil is an important source of government revenue for many 
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countries around the world. The report by IMF (2012a) offers important insights on the 
oil contribution to government revenues across various continents. For instance, 45 per 
cent of government revenue comes from mining alone in Botswana; whilst one-quarter 
of government revenue comes from the combination of petroleum and mining in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Bolivia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Russia (IMF, 2012a).
Furthermore, new discoveries of oil in commercial quantities have been found in 
Uganda and Ghana (IMF, 2012a), which highlights the possibilities of having a high 
percentage of government revenue from petroleum in these countries. Non-renewable 
natural resources are, however, found to a lesser degree but are still significant in most 
OECD countries, which include Australia, Norway, Canada and the UK (Boadway 
& Keen, 2013). The IMF report highlighted that some developing countries were 
increasingly having a high percentage of revenue from petroleum of up to 80% of 
the total government revenue. This is the case for some Middle East countries such 
as Saudi Arabia, African countries such as Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea and Asian 
countries such as Brunei.
Evidence shows that Nigeria and Saudi Arabia charge major oil companies between 
50 to 80% as petroleum profit taxes (Oremade, 2010) due to their reliance on revenues 
from the oil sectors. Despite the dependency on oil revenue by some developing 
countries, evidence points to enormous tax evasions by oil and gas companies. Nigeria 
is amongst the developing countries facing challenges, especially regarding petroleum 
profit tax noncompliance in the form of tax evasion by oil companies operating in the 
upstream oil sector as argued by Oremade (2010) and Ebimobowei & Ebiringa (2012). 
This issue of non-compliance in developing countries, including Nigeria, makes them 
open for future research (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998, p. 856). Thus, there is a 
need for an investigation of the factors influencing tax compliance amongst oil and gas 
companies operating in the upstream Nigerian oil sub-sector. This is desirable because 
the country relies on this sector for its revenue.
However, existing literature on tax compliance has not paid attention to the oil and 
gas sector despite its immense contribution to the economic growth of virtually all oil-
producing countries. For example, in Nigeria, the oil sector contributes to about 70% 
of government revenue and 95% of foreign exchange earnings (Kyari, 2013). Despite 
the enormous contribution of oil to the economic growth of Nigeria, studies that have 
examined the petroleum profit tax compliance are scanty. Only one study was found 
during the search conducted by authors of this paper. The study was conducted by 
Oremede (2010) who investigated the perceptions of petroleum profit tax compliance 
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from the tax administrators’ point of view. The lack of tax compliance studies on the 
oil sector applies to most of the oil-producing countries.
Therefore, this study proposes a framework that expands Allingham and Sandmo’s 
(1972) tax compliance, which initially originated from the seminal work of Becker 
(1968), to incorporate two additional predictor variables that are relevant to the oil and 
gas industry. These variables are royalty rates and environmental regulations, with trust 
in government serving as the moderating variable. If validated, the study will contribute 
to the existing tax compliance literature in several ways. Firstly, the Allingham and 
Sandmo model has not been tested or investigated in the oil and gas sector. This study 
will be the first to explore the power of these variables on oil and gas taxpayers. 
Secondly, the model is expanded by adding two new variables which have not been tested 
in the tax compliance environment, therefore, it will serve as a roadmap for testing the 
effect of these variables on tax compliance behaviour. Thirdly, the introduction of trust 
in government as a moderating variable in the model will make it appear more robust 
and offer additional directions on how trust can stimulate the relationships between 
the proposed constructs (including additional variables) and the petroleum profit tax 
compliance. Fourthly, the current framework will further contribute to the Allingham 
and Sanmo’s (1972) model of tax compliance which did not consider the peculiarity of 
tax compliance behaviour, such as incorporating non-human factors into the model as 
advocated by many scholars. Finally, the model, if validated, would benefit oil and gas 
companies and, ultimately, many host oil and gas countries through the implementation 
of appropriate policy measures. The next section will focus on the proposition and 
development of the constructs. 
2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Deterrence Theory
The first economic tax compliance model was derived from the deterrence theory which 
was the seminal work of Becker (1968). The theory was initially built on the economics 
of crime approach. The theory examined the deterrent effect of threats of punishment 
or sanctions on unwanted or illegal behaviour. The theory postulates that the different 
categories of crimes committed by an individual are not due to motivation to commit 
the crimes but differences in the expected benefits as well as cost of committing such 
crimes. The theory simply implies that taxpayers are rational human beings who use 
available alternatives to maximise expected utility. Becker (1968) stressed that the 
alternative decision on the expected utility of an individual is, however, determined 
by the recognised possible outcomes, which, desirably, are assigned and attach the 
likelihoods of uncertain outcomes.
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Thus, Hamm (1995) stated that the alternative outcomes of each crime are eventually 
multiplied by the weighted outcomes and likelihoods, which assumes that the expected 
alternative utility decision will be obtained, and the utility is maximised, especially 
when the taxpayers select alternative decisions that give the most favourable expected 
utility. Extant literature has categorised deterrence into two groups: specific and 
general deterrence. Jacson, and Millron (1986) argued that research on tax compliance 
behaviour have mostly focused on general deterrence, which simply means the deterrent 
effect of potential sanctions, whilst specific deterrence refers to the deterrent effect of 
actual actions. Consequently, Allingham and Sandmo were the first researchers to use 
the deterrence theory in the taxpayer’s compliance behaviour and came up with what 
we refer to as the A-S model, which was based on Becker’s (1968) economics of crime 
model. The model is what this study intends to expand. Figure 1. depicts the model.
Sources. Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
Figure 1
Accordingly, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) argued that the decision of rational 
taxpayers to evade tax or comply is based on the taxpayer’s choice on risk and 
uncertainty. According to Allingham and Sandmo, under the deterrence theory, the 
compliance decision of taxpayers is the function of three variables, namely tax rate, 
penalty, and probability of detection as depicted in Figure 1 above.  It can be mediated 
by the cost of compliance (Fischer, et al., 1992), hence the introduction of the cost of 
compliance into the model. The expanded deterrence theory by Fischer is depicted in 
Figure 2 below. 
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Sources. Fischer, et al. (1992)
Figure 2. Expanded Allingham and Sandmo model.
2.2 Petroleum Profit Tax
Oremade (2006) noted that the Petroleum Profit Tax is charged to the companies 
operating in the Nigerian oil sector on the value of oil sales at the price prevailing in the 
world oil market. Moreover, crude oil and gas sales for local refining are valued at the 
actual amount realised for  petroleum profit tax, and the value of oil sales at the global 
oil market is compared with the prevailing value at the posted price; where the posted 
price is greater, the tax is charged at the posted price (Gbegi, et al., 2017). Petroleum 
tax refers to the tools and machinery of government used to create more essential rent 
sharing balance between host government and oil and gas companies, and the Nigerian 
petroleum profit tax is a clear example of petroleum taxation (Amiesa, Omowunmi, 
& Joseph, 2018). The Petroleum Profit Tax (hereafter, PPT) is defined as the direct 
tax imposed annually on the chargeable profit of petroleum taxpayers, conducting 
petroleum exploration and production activities, and also serves as the instrument 
used for getting revenue from hydrocarbon wealth by the host country (Evans & Hunt, 
2011). The petroleum profit tax is a tax related to upstream oil operations in the Nigeran 
oil industry (Odusola, 2006).
Generally, the PPT is associated with a profit-sharing element on oil exploration; oil 
mining; and oil prospecting leases, rents, and royalties (Gbegi, et al., 2017). The PPT 
refers to the charging of taxes on the profits accrued in the course of oil operation in 
Nigeria (Nwezeaku, 2005). The petroleum profit tax is assessed from the profits of the 
companies engaged in oil operation for the prevailing accounting period, normally from 
January to December (Anyawu, 1993). Therefore, the current study aims at exploring 
the function of three variables, namely tax rate, penalty, and probability of detection as 
depicted in Figure 1 above.  It can be mediated by the cost of compliance (Fischer, et al., 
1992), hence the introduction of the cost of compliance into the model. The expanded 
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the effects of tax compliance variables on petroleum taxpayers, which is quite new 
and unique in the tax compliance environment. The Petroleum Profit Tax is currently 
at 50% for operations in the deep offshore and inland basin, whilst the rate is 85% for 
operations in the onshore and shallow waters in Nigeria (PPTA, 2004 As amended). 
Moreover, the PPT serves as the dependent variable in the proposed framework of this 
study.
2.3 Trust in Authority
To logically ground our prediction, this section will explain the role of trust in 
authority in moderating the proposed unique interaction effects of the deterrence theory 
variables on petroleum profit tax compliance. Trust could be regarded as the ability 
and willingness to be exposed to the activities of other parties based on the anticipation 
that the other party will do a particular act vital and significant to the trustor, regardless 
of the capability to control or monitor the other party (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995). Consequently, taxpayers who recognise the tax authority as being trustworthy 
are likely to trust it and this may invariably increase compliance (Murphy, 2004). 
Additionally, Kirchler, et al. (2008) argued that trust is one of the significant factors 
that shape compliance. Driving from the work of Kirchler, et al. (2008) on the slippery 
slope framework which proposed two forms of compliance: enforced and voluntary 
tax compliance, it was concluded that voluntary tax compliance is driven by trust in 
authorities. In line with Kirchler, et al. (2008), it was asserted by Gangl, Hofmann, and 
Kirchler (2015) and Hofmann, et al. (2014), in separate studies, that trust leads to tax 
compliance.
Though trust in government has been found to be one of the factors of tax compliance, 
the trust relationship between the authorities and the taxpayers is still considered in 
the context of “cops and robbers” in developing countries (Kastlunger, et al., 2013; 
Muehlbacher, Kirchler, & Schwarzenberger, 2011). Notwithstanding, even in the 
developed nations, the demand for tax compliance by authorities is seen as a burden 
that lowers business profits (Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Alm & McClellan, 
2012; and Torgler, 2011). Trust is important in shaping compliance, because most of 
the taxpayers evaluate whether the authorities (Trustees) pursue objectives that are vital 
to them (Gangl, et al., 2015; Gangl, et al., 2012).
Therefore, trust should be an emotion directed towards other parties and it should 
go beyond just logical evaluation and include genuine care and concern (Johnson 
& Grayson, 2005; Schaubroeck, Lam, & Peng, 2011). Trust is unarguably playing 
a significant and influential role in shaping the relationships between taxpayers and 
authorities, especially where government performance convinces the taxpayers to view 
their authorities as being capable and concerned for their wellbeing (Gobena, & Van 
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Dijke, 2016). Based on these debates, we have argued that trust in authorities will 
moderate the relationships between taxpayers and tax compliance.
2.4 Tax Rates
The tax rate could be regarded as the actual rate of taxes on which the taxpayers are 
anticipated to pay out of their taxable profit to relevant tax authorities. It has been 
argued that significant interest has been shown on corporate income tax reforms which 
eventually widens the base and lowers the tax rates (Gravelle, 2011). Subsequently, 
many scholars have examined the influence of tax rate on tax compliance; for example, 
Mas’ud, et al. (2014) used simple regression to examine the influence of tax rate on 
tax compliance in Africa within the period of 2012 to 2013. The study covered 61 
African countries, and the result indicate a significant negative effect of tax rates on tax 
compliance.
However, their findings have limited validity in other sectors, such as petroleum 
sectors; for this reason, they may not be a good yardstick in determining the actual 
effects of the variables.  Furthermore, a higher tax rate does not essentially imply high 
tax compliance, hence tax payments depend on the tax base (Vintila, Gherghina, & 
Paunescu, 2018). Subsequently, Gius (2018) examined the relationship between tax 
rate and tax revenue. He argued that there is a level of tax rate at which tax revenues 
are maximised. Gius, further asserted that, at a high marginal rate, the relationship is 
inverse because high tax rates may restrain economic activities and decrease the supply 
of labour.
Clotfelter (1983) and Slemrod (1985) investigated marginal tax rates and found that 
marginal tax rates have a significant effect on underreporting. Additionally, Bayer 
(2006) found that higher tax rates increase evasion. Wang, et al. (2018) found a positive 
relationship between effective tax rates and CEO promotion. Similarly, Freindland, 
Maital, and Rutenberg (1978); Collins and Plumlee (1991); Alm, Jackson, and McKee 
(1992); and Park and Hyun (2003), in a laboratory experiment using differential tax 
rates, found that increases in tax rates led to higher evasion. Contrary to the findings 
which postulated that an increase in tax rates may lead to higher tax evasion, some 
studies indicated opposite findings. For instance, Alm, Sanchez, and Dejuan (1995); 
and Mas’ud et al. (2014) found negative relationships between increase in tax rates and 
evasion.  
Based on the empirical findings above the following proposition was developed.
P1 There is a negative relationship between tax rates and petroleum profit tax 
compliance.
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Deterrence models of tax compliance behaviour predict that an increase in tax rates 
will increase compliance (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Alm, Sanchez, and Dejuan, 
1995; and Mas’ud et al., 2014). On the contrary, studies of other researchers on tax rate 
found that higher tax rates decrease compliance, for example, Pommerehne and Weck-
Hannemann (1996); Weck-Hannemann and Pommerehne (1989); Clotfelter (1983); 
Slemrod (1985) Bayer (2006);  Freindland, et al. (1978); Collins and Plumlee (199); 
Alm, et al. (1992); and Park and Hyun (2003). Baron and Kenny (1986) argued that 
where there are mixed findings on the relationships between constructs, a moderating 
variable can be integrated to stimulate the relationship, therefore, based on the mixed 
findings above the following proposition was drawn.
P2 Trust in government will moderate the relationship between tax rates and petroleum 
profit tax compliance, such that the relationship will be weaker or strengthened for the 
companies that have trust in government.
2.5 Penalty Rate
Penalties refer to the negative punishment of paying money on those who violate the 
rules and regulations (Savitri, 2016). Savitri further argued that there are two types 
of tax penalties in tax laws: the criminal sanction and the administrative sanction. 
The administrative sanction is imposed when taxpayers violate administrative rules 
and regulations, as such, taxpayers pay penalties and or interest, whilst the criminal 
sanction is likely to be a jail sentence or prison. Additionally, a penalty is considered 
as the preventive measures employed by the tax authority on taxpayers (Devos, 2013). 
Furthermore, Gordon and Wen (2018) examined tax penalties on fluctuating incomes, 
using longitudinal data in Canada. The study used longitudinal data to estimate the tax 
penalties in the six panels of Canadian data from 1993 to 2010. The result suggested 
that the tax penalty in recent times is lower than in the mid-90s essentially as a result 
of a decrease in marginal tax rates and that the tax penalty is insignificant for most 
taxpayers but remains consequential for many. The results further revealed that 10 
per cent of the taxpayers faced annual tax penalties between the period of 2005-2010, 
nearly 1 per cent of their incomes, and also the tax penalties were ultimate at the lower 
end of the income range of the autonomous self-employed. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence on the relationship between penalty and tax non-compliance indicates a 
positive relationship between the two variables; for example, Virmani (1989) found 
a positive relationship between higher tax penalty rate and tax non-compliance, and 
further argued that imposing higher penalty rates may have induced taxpayers to behave 
dishonestly. Additionally, Lee (2015) argued that the imposed penalty has an indirect 
effect on tax evasion.
Doran (2009) found that penalty may encourage evasion. Furthermore, Sinnasamy and 
Bidin (2017) found that there is a positive relationship between a penalty and tax non-
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compliance. Similarly, Balassone and Jones (1998) argued that the penalty reduces 
the possibility of higher tax evasion. Savitri (2016) found a positive relation between 
penalty and tax compliance through the mediation effect of service quality. The right 
and acceptable penalty being in place will lead to efficient tax administration which 
may influence tax compliance. Additionally, none of the studies available examined 
the influence of tax penalties in the oil and gas sectors despite the influential effect of 
penalties in determining compliance as argued by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and 
Fischer, et al. (1992), where both of these studies postulated that  penalty could lead 
to tax compliance. Therefore, this study utilized the variable to determine whether it 
could lead to PPT compliance or non-compliance in the oil and gas sector, hence the 
development of the following proposition. 
P3 There is a positive relationship between penalty rate and petroleum profit tax 
compliance.
Extant literature on tax penalties demonstrated inconsistent findings which may be 
contextual, sectorial or even methodological. Therefore, this could be one of the reasons 
that require further investigation of the variables. Following Barron and Kenny (1986) 
who emphasize the need for introducing moderating variables once mixed findings 
exist, the following proposition was drawn.
P4 Trust in governments will moderate the relationship between penalty rate and 
petroleum profit tax compliance, such that the relationship will be strengthened or 
weaker for the companies that trust the government.
2.6 Detection Probability
Probability of detection is defined by Chau and Leung (2009) as the possibility that 
the tax authority can discover tax non-compliance by taxpayers. Furthermore, the 
probability of detection has received considerable attention from many scholars. For 
example, Alm, Martinez-Vasquez, and Schneider (2004) emphasised that the probability 
of detection has a significant double deterrent effect on taxpayers. The central argument 
here is that, the nexus is what they refer to as the direct deterrent effect of taxpayers that 
are being audited as well as the indirect effect of taxpayers that are not being audited. 
They further stated that, as the probability of detection becomes higher, it may or may 
not encourage tax compliance. As stated in Kirchler (2007), a survey study by Mason 
and Calvin (1978) stressed that tax evaders always regard the chance of being detected 
as low.
Palil and Mustapha (2011) examined, using multiple regression, the determinants of 
tax behaviour in Malaysia. Through the employment of a survey of 1,073 taxpayers, 
the found that when taxpayers assumed that they would not be detected as a result of an 
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insufficient investigation, they embarked on tax evasion strategy using less detectable 
documentation to pay less tax. Notwithstanding, the probabilities of detection may 
invariably encourage some taxpayers to declare their true income and, eventually, may 
increase compliance. Allingham and Sandmoh (1972) submitted that an increase in 
probability of detection will, eventually, always lead to a greater income being declared. 
Empirical evidence on the influence of the probability of detection on tax compliance 
revealed mixed and inconsistent findings. For instance, Alm (1991) found a positive 
relationship between the probability of detection and tax compliance. Additionally, 
Mason and Calvin (1978), in their research using a survey, indicated that evading 
taxpayers perceived the chances of being caught lower than honest taxpayers. On the 
other hand, Young (1994) and Slemrod, et al. (2001), in different studies, showed 
that detection probability was found to be an important determinant of a taxpayer’s 
compliance. Though, they reported that probabilities of detection were negatively 
correlated with compliance behaviour. Based on the mixed empirical findings above 
and the adaption of Barron and Kenny’s assertion on the moderating variable, the 
following proposition was established. 
P5 There is a positive relationship between detection probability and petroleum profit 
tax compliance.
P6 Trust in government will moderate the relationship between the probability of 
detection and petroleum profit tax compliance, such that the relationship will be 
strengthened or weaker for the companies that trust the government.
2.7 Tax Compliance Cost
Compliance cost refers to the cost incurred by a taxpayer as a result of fulfilling his/her 
tax obligations separately from the tax liability (Main, 2012). Additionally, compliance 
cost is the aggregate of the cost incurred by taxpayers in addition to their tax liabilities, 
in achieving the taxation requirements (Rahmawati, as cited in Savitri, 2016). Tax 
compliance costs refers to the costs that are incurred by third parties or taxpayers, above 
the normal tax liabilities in a quest to meet the requirements of the tax system (Godwin, 
1978). Johnstons (1961) defined corporate tax compliance cost “as the reduction in 
operating costs, exclusive of the tax itself, which may result if the federal income tax 
where eliminated” (Godwin, 1978, pg 391).
Haig (1935) who mailed a questionnaire to 1600 members of the American Management 
Association (AMA) found that high compliance cost was related to low administrative 
cost, and finally argued that there is a nexus between compliance and administrative 
cost. However, Stamatopoulos, Hadjidema, and Eleftheriou (2017) found corporate tax 
compliance costs of considerable size and differing with numerous companies’ unique 
characteristics, which included other companies’ locations, legal forms, and sectors 
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in which they operated. Eichfelder and Kegels (2014) found empirical evidence that 
tax authorities are one of the significant costs drivers which give rise to taxpayers’ 
tax administration cost to reach up to 25%. It is, however, important to note that there 
is limited empirical evidence on the relationship between compliance cost and tax 
compliance as argued by Abdul-Jabbar (2009) as most studies highlight the magnitudes 
of compliance cost in terms of values.
Consequently, few empirical studies on tax compliance cost concerning tax compliance 
were found by Abdul-Jabbar & Pope (2008); Abdul-Jabbar (2009); Sapiei & Abdullah 
(2014); and Adam & Yusof, (2018). The size of compliance cost and compliance 
behaviour shows no statistical significance (Abdul-Jabbar & Pope, 2008). Based on 
the findings above and the non-availability of empirical evidence on the relationship 
between the cost of compliance and tax compliance in the oil and gas sector, the 
following proposition was developed. 
P7 There is a negative relationship between compliance cost and petroleum profit tax 
compliance.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between tax compliance cost and tax compliance 
is scanty in existing literature. However, the few available ones showed mixed findings; 
for instance, Sapiei, et al. (2017) found a positive relationship between tax compliance 
cost and goods and services tax (GST) in Malaysia. Compliance costs were found not 
to influence SME’s tax non-compliance in Malaysia (Abdul-Jabbar, 2009).  On the 
contrary, other studies found tax compliance cost to have a significant negative impact 
on GST non-compliance (Xin, et al., 2015; Faridy, et al., 2014; Nzioki & Peter, 2014; 
and Adam & Yusof, 2018). Based on the inconsistent findings above, and following 
Barron and Kenny (1986), who stated that where there is the existence of inconsistent 
findings, a moderating variable can be introduced to stimulate the relationship, the 
following proposition was developed.
P8 Trust in government will moderate the relationship between compliance cost and 
petroleum profit tax compliance, such that the relationship will be strengthened or 
weaker for the companies that trust the government.
2.8 Royalty Rates
Royalty refers to the share of production emanating from lease contracts between the 
rightful owner of the oil and gas or other mineral resources, in other words called the 
“lessor”, and the “lessee” who is given the right to use the lands for the development 
of mineral resources. In return for granting the lessee the rights to explore the mineral 
resources, the lessee gives a share of the mineral of any kind produced or a royalty to 
the lessor (Carr & Owen, 1997). On the other hand, investors participate in royalties 
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through production, and most investors extend their interests through demands to adjust 
the royalty rates to suit them and warn that any attempt to increase royalty rates may 
discourage investment (Onifade, 2017). Moreover, concerning changes in production 
relating to royalty, Gowharzad and Al-Harthy (2011) argued that there will be a higher 
royalty rate as production increases, therefore, the government will eventually benefit 
from an increase in production and also charge lower royalty rates as production 
decreases. Though the relationship between royalty rates and petroleum profit tax 
compliance has not been critically investigated, studies are available that indicate 
the significance of studying the sector as well as the variables concerning taxation 
which could serve as the basis for forming the hypotheses.  For example, Kemp (1992) 
examined the effectiveness and efficiency of the petroleum fiscal regime in Norway, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK in collecting natural resources tax (economic 
rents), from the development of new fields associated with uncertainty related to 
development costs and oil prices. In a similar vein, Osmundsen (1998) established a 
model of dynamic non-renewable resources taxation.
Dismukes, Bueke, and Mesyanzhinov (2006) reiterated that, an evolving challenge facing 
several energy-producing countries will be an establishment of policies that encourages 
sustained economic development of growing oil and gas properties, especially since 
under royalty relief scenarios an increasing amount of revenue is realised by the states. 
Furthermore, Boyd and Khowsrow (1994) investigated how energy cuts to balance 
with income tax increased the effect of consumption, production, and welfare in the 
Philippines. They concluded that energy tax cuts improved the energy sector though 
it decreased the manufacturing sector’s output irrespective of the level of energy tax 
reduction. Interestingly, this corresponded with the earlier empirical evidence which 
reported taxation’s impact on the economics of natural resources (Isehunwa & Uzoalor, 
2011).
Based on the above evidence which, eventually, highlighted the importance of natural 
resources tax in the state’s economic development, as well as how the connections of 
natural resources tax, such as royalty to the mainstream of taxation, is very significant, 
and also the lack of existing studies that test the influence of royalty rates on petroleum 
profit tax compliance, the following proposition was developed.
P9 There is a relationship between royalty rates and petroleum profit tax compliance
The empirical literature on the relationship between royalty rates and natural resources 
tax is scanty. However, some empirical studies are available that indicated the nexus 
between royalty rate and natural resources taxation.  For example, Kemp (1992) 
examined the effectiveness and efficiency of the petroleum fiscal regime in Norway, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK in collecting natural resources taxes (economic 
rents & royalty) from the development of new fields associated with uncertainty related 
to development costs and oil prices. Dismukes, Bueke, and Mesyanzhinov (2006) 
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reiterated that an evolving challenge facing several energy-producing countries will 
be the establishment of policies that encourage the sustained economic development 
of growing oil and gas properties, especially since under royalty relief scenarios, an 
increasing amount of revenue is realised by the states. 
Furthermore, Boyd and Khowsrow (1994) investigated how energy cuts to balance with 
income tax increase affect consumption, production, and welfare in the Philippines. 
They concluded that energy tax cuts improved the energy sector though it decreased 
the manufacturing sector’s output irrespective of the level of energy tax reduction. 
Interestingly, this corresponded with the recent empirical evidence which reported 
taxation’s impact on the economics of natural resources (petroleum tax and royalty) 
(Isehunwa & Uzoalor, 2011). A transparent tax system provided by tax authorities 
might greatly influence the relationship between royalty payments and petroleum 
profit tax compliance. Based on this assertion, the current study has argued that trust 
in authorities will stimulate the relationship between royalty payments and petroleum 
profit tax compliance.  
P10 Trust in authorities will moderate the relationship between royalty rate and 
petroleum profit tax compliance, such that the relationship will be weakened or 
strengthened for the companies that trust the government.
2.9 Environmental Regulations
Environmental regulations refer to the use of urban and natural socio-economic and 
physical environments in the service of regulations (Korpela, et al., 2018). The view 
from traditional economics states that, strict environmental regulations may restrict 
the technological novelty of a company (Lankoski, 2017). Additionally, environmental 
regulations will restrict the effectiveness and efficiency of technological modernisations 
and, subsequently, reduce the efficiency of the manufacturing sector through empirical 
analysis (Leeuwen & Mohnen, 2013; Zhao & Sun, 2016). Moreover, Guo, Xia, 
Zhang, and Zhang (2018) argued that environmental regulations cause pressure on 
the company’s behaviour which may result in an increase in environmental cost and 
may eventually affect the company’s profitability. Other scholars, such as Feichtinger, 
Hartl, Kort, and Veliov (2005), stressed that strict environmental regulations targeted 
at reducing emissions mostly have a significant effect on industrial development. Based 
on the above debate, it is important to note that environmental regulations affect the 
costs of production of companies as well as profits, which may affect taxes. This further 
highlights the importance of investigating the effect of this variable on taxpayers.
Nevertheless, empirical evidence regarding the relationship between environmental 
regulations and petroleum profit tax is not available and this study appears to be the 
first of its kind to test the relationships between the variables in question. As such, other 
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studies on environmental regulations that are related to the variable will be reviewed to 
serve as the basis for the hypothesis’s development. For example, Cerqueti and Coppier 
(2014), whose study on the issue of evasion and environmental policies suggested that 
environments are affected by numerous economic factors, referred to the economic 
factors as needing to include environmental inspectors (regulators and tax inspectors) 
and polluting firms (taxpayers).
Thus, several scholars concentrated on the impact of human activities on pollution and 
natural resources, technological processes, and energy consumption (Bosetti, Messina, 
& Valente, 2002; Tapiero, 2009; and Cerqueti, 2014). Consequently, Song, Wang, 
and Sun (2018) examined the relationships amongst environmental regulations, green 
technology and profit in manufacturing amongst 1,197 firms in China between 2008 to 
2015. They found that environmental regulations moderated the relationship between 
green technology and the profit of manufacturing firms. Based on the above evidence 
and the lack of studies that empirically tested the relationship between environmental 
regulations and petroleum profit tax compliance, the following proposition was 
developed. 
P11 There is a relationship between environmental regulations and Petroleum Profit 
Tax Compliance
A few studies have examined the influence of environmental regulations on different 
aspects of human, political, and economic systems. For instance, Zhao, et al. 
(2018) investigated whether environmental regulations undermine an energy firm’s 
performance, and using event study methodology, the study found environmental 
regulations to have several effects on the stock price of China’s listed fossil-based 
energy firms. Other findings revealed that environmental regulations have great 
but negative effects on listed fossil-based energy firms that have a higher level of 
Environmental Information Disclosure (EID) than firms with a lower level of EID, 
which invariably poses great challenges to policymakers in designing relevant and 
appropriate environmental policies.
Additionally, Cheng and Liu (2018) examined the effects of public attention on the 
environmental performance of most polluting companies in China. Using big data 
from web searches, the result found that companies which are open to a high level 
of public attention have better environmental performance. Furthermore, employing a 
quasi-experiment in China, Zhang, Chen, and Guo (2018) investigated whether central 
supervision enhances local environmental enforcement. The result revealed that central 
supervision considerably decreased industrial Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) 
emission by almost 26.8%, which highlighted the need for improvement in China’s 
environmental regulations using central supervision. On the other hand, an empirical 
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exploration study on environmental regulation and green skills was conducted by Vona, 
et al. (2018) and the result indicated that changes in environmental regulations were 
found to not affect the overall employment. Based on the empirical findings above the 
following preposition was developed.
P 12 Trust in government will moderate the relationship between environmental 
regulations and petroleum profit tax compliance, such that the relationship will be 
weakened or strengthened for the companies that trust the government.
3.0 Proposed Conceptual Framework
Following the literature discussed above, Figure 3 shows the theoretical framework 
which depicts the direct as well as indirect relationships of the constructs under 
consideration.
Figure 3. Proposed framework.
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4.0 Conclusion/Policy Implication
The paper discussed the moderating effect of trust in government on the relationships 
between the tax compliance variables of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and petroleum 
profit tax compliance. All the variables comprised tax rates, penalties, detection 
probability, and compliance cost, which were expanded with two more predictor variables 
relevant to the oil and gas industry (royalty rates and environmental regulations), 
moderating variable (trust in government) and petroleum profit tax compliance  as 
depicted in Figure 1 above. The paper argued that trust in government can moderate 
the relationships between the constructs in the framework and the explained variable 
(petroleum profit tax compliance). Additionally, the study can benefit the international 
tax authorities generally and the Nigerian tax authority in particular. The study will 
help the tax authorities in developing and administering tax laws and policies to reduce 
tax evasion and increase the overall level of corporate tax compliance with particular 
reference to petroleum companies. Moreover, it will provide insight into the regulatory 
agencies as regards the appropriate tax system to be used in their respective countries 
which will be friendlier to both government and oil operators. The study will serve as 
evidence for the regulatory agencies to offer an appropriate recommendation to the 
government for the need to restructure the existing tax system for the betterment of 
both the government and the oil companies.
Thirdly, the study will also be beneficial to other countries having abundant natural 
resources in a number of ways: the study will help other countries to come up with more 
robust tax structures capable of increasing PPT compliance. The study will help those 
countries in designing simple tax systems that will increase compliance, especially in 
the area where similarities exist amongst the countries. Fourthly, the study will be of 
great importance to the larger academic environment. Petroleum taxation has not been 
critically investigated using the tax compliance model. From the contextual perspective, 
the study will provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the PPT in Nigeria. 
Thus, it will provide a roadmap for other researchers interested in investigating the 
relationships between tax compliance variables and petroleum profit tax compliance 
amongst oil companies in other countries around the globe.
The framework will expand the existing economic deterrence theory by adding two 
more predictor variables (Royalty rate & environmental regulations) and a moderating 
variable (Trust in government), thereby contributing theoretically to the tax compliance 
literature. The model is in the process of validation, if validated empirically, some 
policy insights can be offered to the oil and gas host countries which can benefit the 
government, oil operators and by extension any other potential investors willing to 
embark in oil and gas activities around the globe.
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